Phishing campaigns
Phishing is the number-one intrusion vector. This card covers how a campaign is designed and run in an authorized engagement (from pretext to infrastructure to metrics) and how it’s stopped on the defensive side.
Mass phishing generic email to many people (low rate, high volume)Spear phishing targeted, personalized with OSINT (see se-pretexting) -> high effectivenessWhaling targeted at senior executives (CEO/CFO)BEC Business Email Compromise: CEO/vendor fraud to redirect paymentsClone phishing copy of a legitimate email with a swapped link/attachmentCampaign goals (what’s measured)
Section titled “Campaign goals (what’s measured)”- credential theft (cloned login page on controlled infrastructure)- payload execution (attachment/link) to gain access (in authorized engagement)- plain awareness metric: how many click / report?Anatomy of the pretext and lure
Section titled “Anatomy of the pretext and lure”Sender look-alike domain (typosquatting), trusted display name, or compromised domainSubject urgency/authority ("Action required: your password expires today")Body imitated brand, link that looks legit, clear call to actionLanding cloned login page on YOUR infrastructure (only with authorization)Timing Tue-Thu during work hours; avoid language/formatting errorsInfrastructure (authorized engagement)
Section titled “Infrastructure (authorized engagement)”- credible-looking domain + categorization + "aged" registration- authenticated mail to reach the inbox: SPF/DKIM/DMARC of the attacker domain- TLS on the landing; redirect after capture; clean handling of captured credentials- campaign framework (GoPhish, see se-tools) for sending, tracking, and metrics# NOTE: every captured credential is personal data -> handle per GDPR and destroy after the reportFilter-evasion techniques (conceptual)
Section titled “Filter-evasion techniques (conceptual)”- links in legitimate redirectors/services, QR in an image ("quishing")- HTML attachments that build the page client-side; light body obfuscation- avoid trigger words and raw URLs; personalization to not look like mass mailMetrics and reporting
Section titled “Metrics and reporting”Open / click / credential-submit / report rateTime to first report (the sooner, the better the defensive culture)-> the report's goal is to TRAIN and improve controls, not to name peopleDefense (blue team)
Section titled “Defense (blue team)”- Phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys): even if the password is stolen, they don’t get in.
- DMARC at p=reject + SPF/DKIM; mail filtering, attachment sandboxing, URL rewriting.
- Training + simulations periodically; an easy report button and fast SOC response.
- Detection of look-alike (typosquatting) domains and blocking; isolate the click (remote browsing).
Real-world cases
Section titled “Real-world cases”- BEC: billions in cumulative losses per IC3/FBI; email fraud without malware.
- Google/Facebook (2013-2015): BEC that diverted ~$100M with fake vendor invoices.
- Ukraine / APT: spear-phishing as initial access in high-profile campaigns (see MITRE ATT&CK).
- MFA-theft campaigns with Evilginx/EvilProxy (real-time session phishing) widespread.
Testing checklist
Section titled “Testing checklist”- Written scope and authorization (target list, exclusions)
- OSINT to personalize (spear) — see se-pretexting
- Domain/sender and mail authentication prepared
- Lure with a clear influence principle and imitated brand
- Landing cloned on own infrastructure with TLS
- Open/click/credential/report tracking configured
- GDPR handling of captured credentials (and destruction)
- Report aimed at training and controls